Adapting Policy Transfer to Asian Context: Conditional Cash Transfer in the Philippines

 Introduction

The Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) program in the Philippines, also known as the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps), represents the Philippine government’s effort to address the chronic poverty by providing financial assistance with specific conditions to impoverished families (Kim & Yoo, 2015). Initiated in 2007, the program was inspired by the success of similar initiatives in Latin America (Howlett et al., 2018). In this case, Dolowitz and Marsh’s (2000) Policy Transfer Model provides a foundation for examining policy transfer; however, its Western-centric framework does not fully capture the complexities of implementation and the unique characteristics of diverse models of public policy in Asian countries, as illustrated by the CCT case in the Philippines. This essay examines how the policy transfer framework explains the adoption of the CCT program in the Philippines and proposes reconceptualization that address the role of community engagement, timing, and prerequisite conditions to adapt the model to the nuances of Asian public policy.

 

Examining Policy Transfer in the CCT Program in the Philippines

The Pantawid Program (4Ps) is the Philippine government’s flagship poverty initiative, serving over 5.5 million households and considered successful in achieving its objectives (Acosta et al., 2019; Acosta & Velarde, 2015; Bhargava & Raha, 2015). The CCT program offers cash benefits to impoverished households with pregnant women or at least one child, contingent upon adherence to specific behavioural requirements (Saguin & Howlett, 2019). Launched in 2007, the program was inspired by similar successful initiatives, such as Mexico’s Oportunidades and Brazil’s Bolsa Familia (Curry et al., 2013). Whereas Oportunidades focus on conditional social protection to support to human capital investment, and Bolsa Familia centres on poverty alleviation through specific social assistance, the 4Ps program aim to disrupt the cycle of intergenerational poverty by encouraging households to invest in their children’s education and health. (Howlett et al., 2018).

The adoption of 4Ps in the Philippines exemplifies ‘second generation of CCT,’ embodying the transfer ideas about the program’s instrumental logic and objectives. This process aligns with what is widely recognised as Policy Transfer (Howlett et al., 2018, p. 269). Policy transfer is defined as “the process by which policies, governance structures, institutions, and ideas in certain political systems, times, and/or places are adopted in the development of policies, governance structures, institutions, and ideas in another pollical system, time, and/or place” (D. Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996, p. 344). The Dolowitz and March Model of policy transfer addresses seven key questions: “why do actors engage in policy transfer? Who are the actors? What is transferred? From where are lessons drawn? What is the degree of transfer? What restricts or facilitates the policy transfer process? and how the process of policy transfer related to policy success or policy failure?” (D. P. Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000, p. 8).

Dolowitz and March’s (2000) framework highlights two dimensions of policy transfer: voluntary transfer, which occurs through a direct choice stemming from dissatisfaction or a problem with the status quo, and coercive transfer, where a supranational agency or government pressures another country to adopt a policy in line with their own interest (D. P. Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000). The adoption of CCT in the Philippines emerged from the government’s efforts to address chronic poverty, as existing solutions at that time were far from systematic (Saguin & Howlett, 2019). This initiative began with the participation of Philippines delegation in a CCT conference organised by the World Bank in June 2006. Following this, a feasibility study was conducted, leading to a pilot project covering 6,000 households in 2007 (Kim & Yoo, 2015). These steps by the Philippines government reflect characteristics of voluntary transfer. However, international partners, particularly the Asian Development Bank (ADB), The World Bank, and AusAID, played a significant role, funding approximately 22% of the program alongside the government’s own resources and actively participating in program implementation (Bhargava & Raha, 2015; Dodd et al., 2022). The involvement of these international organisations, which also act as ‘agents of coercive transfer,’ indicates a blend of voluntary and coercive transfer in this context (D. P. Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000).

Furthermore, Dolowitz and March (2000) identified nine actors in policy transfer: “elected officials, political parties, civil servants/bureaucrats, think tanks, supranational governmental and non-governmental institutions, and consultants” (p. 10). Additional influential non-state experts include epistemic communities (Dunlop, 2009), transnational philanthropic institutions (Stone, 2004), and instrument constituencies (Béland et al., 2018). However, international organisations remain the most prominent actors in policy transfer (D. P. Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000).

In the context of the Philippines’s CCT program, key actors include the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) and international organisations like the World Bank, The ADB, and AusAID, which provided financial, administrative, and technical support. Additionally, DSWD collaborated with partner such as the Department of Educations, Health, and Interior and Local Government, and the Land Bank to monitor and administer the CCT program (Dodd et al., 2022). Moreover, community engagement also played critical role, with societal organisations, volunteers, and citizens actively contributing to program implementation and establishing transparency and accountability mechanisms to combat corruption (Bhargava & Raha, 2015).

 

Reconceptualising Policy Transfer

The experience of adopting the CCT program in the Philippines reveals aspects that require reconceptualization within Dolowitz and March’ (2000) framework of policy transfer, which tends to be Western-centric, with case studies primarily focused on the U.S. and the U.K. (Legrand, 2021). This reconceptualization aims to accommodate the diverse and heterogeneous nature of public policy in Asia (Saguin & Sha, 2021), by focusing on three main aspects: redefining ‘who involved in policy transfer,’ exploring a potential new conceptualisation of ‘when to transfer,’ and identifying ‘prerequisite conditions’ that correlate with the success or failure of transferred policies.

 

Reconceptualising ‘who is involved in policy transfer’

Dolowitz and Marsh’s (2000) model identifies nine categories of political actors, but it inadequately addresses networks of actors with shared objectives and the role of community engagement in the context of policy transfer in Asian policy transfer. Firstly, actor networks called ‘instrument constituencies,” play a critical role in policy transfer (Béland et al., 2018). Howlett et al. (2018) argues that the 4Ps program in the Philippines is a ‘by-product of an instrument constituency’ that advocates transnationally for using CCT to address poverty (p. 272). An instrument constituency refers to “set of actors who share a common belief in the efficacy and effectiveness of certain policy tools and advocates their deployment in different context around the world” (Béland et al., 2018, p. 464). In 4Ps program, the actors involved are not merely individuals acting individually but are part of a community united by a common purpose (Howlett et al., 2018). In this case, the central government, led by the DSWD, alongside local government units (LGUs) and international organisations such as ADB, AusAID, and the World Bank, coalesce within the instrument constituency, motivated to support, and sustain the global momentum of CCT programs (Kim & Yoo, 2015; Voß & Simons, 2014). In other words, the actors involved in policy transfer, as conceptualised by Dolowitz and March (2000), need to be reconceptualise in terms of their roles within a network, not merely as standalone individuals, as demonstrated by the CCT case in the Philippines.

Secondly, the Dolowitz and March’s (2000) model tends to overlook the role of community engagement, despite its critical importance to the success of policy transferred, as evidenced by in the case of the CCT program in the Philippine. Community engagement is defined as “two-way interaction between citizens and governments or the private sector which give citizens a stake in decision-making with the objective to improve intermediate and final development outcomes” (Acosta et al., 2019). The spectrum of citizen engagement includes participation, collaboration, consultation, and empowerment (Bhargava & Raha, 2015). In the context of the Philippines’ 4Ps, community engagement, including civil society volunteers, acted as a facilitator in the implementation of the CCT program by effectively linking beneficiaries with the authorities, from the pilot project through to the expansion of CCT coverage (Acosta & Velarde, 2015).

Community engagement also played a crucial role in minimising the inherent risk associated with CCT programs, particularly risks of fraud, errors, and corruption (Bhargava & Raha, 2015). Kim and Yoo (2015) state that the CCT program faced a high risk of failure due to pervasive patronage politics in the Philippines, where politicians could influence program implementation by selecting beneficiaries based on political interests. In line with this, Patel et al. (2014) identify several governance risks unique to the Philippines, such as its large geographic spread, diversity, and high levels of corruption, which impact national programs that rely on objective data. In this case, community engagement serves as an agent of transparency and a reporting mechanism for any violations occurring within their local areas (Hayakawa et al., 2015; Ponce, 2022). Moreover, community engagement is regarded as the ‘third eye’ of DSDW, with four primary roles: Bantay, acting as a watchdog against corruption; Tulay, facilitating feedback and monitoring; Gabay, offering technical assistance; and Kaagapay, partnering to support sustainable livelihood development (Bhargava & Raha, 2015, p. 44). The role of community engagement was evident in the government’s follow up on 485,000 grievance reports from the public between 2009 and 2013, contributing to the program’s transparency and accountability (Bhargava & Raha, 2015).

In sum, the role of community engagement as a key factor in the success transfer and implementation of the CCT program in the Philippines highlights the need to consider it as part of the actor framework in Dolowitz and Marsh’s (2000) model, calling for its reconceptualization to better capture its essential contribution.

 

New conceptualisation of ‘When to Transfer’ and ‘Prerequisite Conditions’

Dolowitz and March’ (2000) framework of policy transfer does not address explicitly the temporal aspects of transfer, including when transfer occurs, its duration, or completion criteria. A conceptualisation of ‘When’ within policy transfer is need, as critiques argue that the framework has failed to provide tools for evaluating whether policy transfer has actually occurred (Evans, 2009). Meanwhile, Page (2000) states that the transfer process does not have to be based on a single action, such as a study trip or report based on a set of foreign policy examples but may instead require a more extended period, which complicates determining the ‘when’ aspect of policy transfer. Furthermore, the timing of policy transfer can involve ‘fast policy,’ where specific instruments circulate transnationally at a rapid pace, as seen with Conditional Cash Transfers, or ‘slow policy,’ which allows time for broader problem recognition and acceptance. (Rahm, 2023).

A conceptualisation of ‘when to transfer’ is needed to determine when the Philippine government initiated the policy transfer process. Did it begin when the Philippine delegation attended the CCT Conference in Turkey in 2006, during the feasibility study, or upon the implementation of the policy? (Howlett et al., 2018; Kim & Yoo, 2015). The concept of ‘time; is also essential to ascertain the duration of policy transfer and when it can be considered complete (Benson & Jordan, 2011). Moreover, the Dolowitz and Marsh’s (2000) model cannot be used to assess when the Philippine government began or completed the policy transfer process (Evans, 2009). It is unclear whether the transfer process was complete after the CCT pilot project, upon the enactment of specific legislation, or at another point (Cuizon, 2022; James & Lodge, 2003). Additionally, questions arise about whether the policy transfer is indeed complete, given that the CCT in the Philippines continues to evolve through expanded coverage, increased benefits, and refinements driven by feedback mechanisms, and shifts in the political environment and leadership (Rosser & Murphy, 2023). The continuous visits of Philippine political leaders to Latin American countries where CCT originated further suggest that the transfer process may still be ongoing (Kim & Yoo, 2015).

Furthermore, the concept of ‘when to transfer’ can also refer to specific conditions under which a government decide to undertake policy transfer, linked to the potential for policy success or failure (McCONNELL, 2010). I posit that the idea of prerequisite conditions has been implicitly suggested in the policy transfer model, yet it has not been fully conceptualised, especially in relation to policy success or failure. Dolowitz and March (2000) Identify three factors contributing to policy failure: uninformed transfer, when the borrowing country lacks sufficient information about the policy and is operations; incomplete transfer, when critical elements of success are not transferred; and inappropriate transfer, which result from insufficient attention to the economic, political, social, and ideological context of both the transferring and borrowing countries.

The concept of success or failure provides a set of prerequisite conditions that must be met to increase the likelihood of successful policy transfer, which can be incorporated into the policy transfer framework, as illustrated by the CCT case in the Philippines. For instance, the successful transfer of policy from Latin American Countries to the Philippines occurred because the economic, social, political, and ideological conditions were relatively similar (Bhargava & Raha, 2015; Hawkins et al., 2020) – factors that Dolowitz and March (2000) consider essential in avoiding inappropriate transfer. Additionally, some argue that this transfer succeeded due to a South-South Connection (Curry et al., 2013). Another example is the successful transfer of the Gateway Review process to Australia from the UK, attributed to political and cultural similarities (Fawcett & Marsh, 2012). Conversely, conflicts between Ghana’s socio-cultural norms and Western norms have led to challenges in policy transfer in Ghana (Duong, 2023).

Furthermore, using Roger’s (1994) characteristics of innovation, Common (1999) argues that the prerequisite conditions that either facilitate or hinder policy transfer consist of several key characteristics. First, relative advantage, which assesses the extent to which a policy is perceived as better that the one it replaces. Second, compatibility, which evaluates how consistent the policy is with the values, past experiences, and needs of potential adopters. Third, trialability, or the extent to which the policy can be experimented with on limited basis. Forth, observability, referring to how visible the outcomes of the transfer are. Finally, past policy, which examines how the new policy interacts with institutional constraints (Common, 1999).

The concepts of timing and prerequisites conditions for success of CCT policy transfer to the Philippines, while not thoroughly examined within the Dolowitz and March’ (2000) model, can be explored through the criteria of innovation (Common, 1999). For instance, the success of CCT in Mexico and Brazil provided a perceived of relative advantage over existing policies in the Philippines (Debonneville & Diaz, 2013; Schober, 2019). Moreover, economic and socio-cultural similarities between the Philippines and Latin America within a South-South Cooperation framework (Curry et al., 2013) align with the criterion of compatibility. The CCT’ alignment with the policy environment in the Philippines reflects its low complexity. Additionally, the CCT pilot project involving 6,000 households demonstrates the concepts of trialability and observability, allowing visible testing of policy transfer outcomes on manageable scale (Common, 1999; Kim & Yoo, 2015)

To conclude, the Dolowitz and Marsh’s (2000) framework, which demonstrates limitations in explaining the success of policy transfer in the Philippines, should incorporate the concept of ‘when to transfer’ and ‘prerequisite conditions’ to better accommodate the diverse characteristics of “Asian style” public policy (Saguin & Sha, 2021).

 

Conclusion and Recommendation

The case of the Conditional Cash Transfer program in the Philippines explores the applicability of Dolowitz and Marsh’ (2000) policy transfer model to a non-Western context. Although the policy transfer model can explain certain aspects of policy transfer process within the Philippine CCT, it reveals limitations in addressing the involvement of additional actors, such as community engagement and the role of instrument constituencies. Furthermore, it does not account for the concept of timing, specifically when the transfer process begins and when it can be considered complete. Additionally, the model lacks capacity to examine specific conditions that contribute to the successful transfer and implementation of the program by the Philippine government.

To improve the model’s relevance in an Asian context, it is recommended that policymakers and scholars consider incorporating a reconceptualization of “who engages in policy transfer,” “when to transfer,” and the prerequisite conditions for successful policy transfer. This expansion reflects the diversity in policy transfer across Asian countries like Philippines.

(Word count: 2667)

Written by Kristian Danang Purnomo for Public Policy in the Asian Century Assignment 3

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